THERE are lawmakers who believe they are above the law simply by virtue of the name they carry.
Faced with the prospect of a law that could limit their selfish political ambitions, they immediately speak out, all too ready to forget that they swore an oath to preserve and defend the Constitution, which clearly states in Article II, Section 26: "The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law."
The operative phrase there is "as may be defined by law." The Supreme Court held that this section prohibiting political dynasties is not self-executing and thus requires an act of Congress before it is carried out.
That means political dynasties cannot be banned until Congress does its job — and the legislative record in this regard has been dismal for the last 37 years.
From the time the Constitution took effect in 1987 until 2014 or a period of 27 years, any anti-political dynasty bill languished and died at the committee level. House Bill 3587, sponsored by Capiz Rep. Fredenil Castro, was the first measure to make it to the plenary floor, but it still did not garner enough support from lawmakers who came from powerful political clans themselves. These legislators make up an estimated 70 percent of the House of Representatives.
Similar bills in the Senate have not fared any better.
Now, a group of lawyers has petitioned the Supreme Court to compel Congress to pass a law defining and prohibiting political dynasties.
In their petition, the lawyers say the 1987 Constitution has a prohibition against political dynasties that should be mandatory and that Congress should pass a law to make it effective.
"Petitioners submit that the duty is ministerial; it is mandatory for Congress to pass a law defining and prohibiting political dynasties," the petition reads.
Lawmakers who oppose a ban on political dynasties invariably argue that citizens deserve a choice that should not be limited arbitrarily and that elections are the best measure of who deserves to be in public office. They do not acknowledge an inconvenient truth — that political dynasties so corrupt the electoral process that they no longer reflect what the people truly want.
Numerous studies have shown that life barely improves economically or politically for poor communities ruled by a powerful clan.
A study conducted by the Ateneo School of Government from 1988 to 2019 showed that the percentage of fat dynasties — those with more than two family members occupying government offices at the same time — increased from 56.96 percent in 2004 to 80.25 percent in 2019 for the position of governor, and from 53.85 percent to 67.9 percent for the position of vice governor over the same period. Political dynasties also accounted for 53.38 percent of the position of mayor in 2019, up from 39.56 percent in 2004, and 38.91 percent of the position of vice mayor in 2019, up from 27.84 percent in 2004.
"The empirical evidence suggests that dynasties have an adverse effect on governance, and hence also development," the study by Ronald Mendoza, Leonardo Jaminola 3rd and Jurel Yap says.
"We are slowly becoming less democratic over time, particularly in the poorest areas of the country, and if we don't stop this, democracy will slowly die," Mendoza says. Many people in these communities do not have the power to choose their leaders and vote freely because of the entrenched political dynasties.
Moreover, checks and balances do not work in fat dynasties. "How will the checks and balances work if the governor is related to two to three provincial members? How will the checks and balances work if the children of the governor are mayors in two to three towns?" The likely result is corrupt governance.
It is still unclear how the Supreme Court will rule on the latest petition, but it has been reluctant in the past to compel Congress to act on the grounds that such judicial intervention would violate the principle of the separation of powers.
But in a 2016 piece in the Global Anticorruption Blog, Beatriz Paterno suggests new ways the Court might look at the issue to justify its intervention.
First, the Court could argue that intervention is justified because the system of checks and balances itself is so corrupted by the continued success of political dynasties.
Second, the Court could say this issue is different because it would not be ordering Congress to act on the basis of what the tribunal believes is the appropriate subject of legislation but what the Constitution names as a necessary object of legislation.
Either of these approaches would be preferable to doing nothing and might finally break the 37-year cycle of corruption and impunity that so often begins with a family name.
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