KUALA LUMPUR: As I was saying, I had the privilege of teaching a course on the development of modern strategy (with an ineluctable focus on warfare) over the past few months, and it set me thinking about the applicability of some of the successful strategies versus the not so successful ones in the history of international relations to modern, albeit domestic politics.

Without delving too much into the evolving theories of war or diplomatic strategy, there are glaring historical examples of nations and leaders who, with the unenviable benefit of hindsight, adopted strategies that might be said to have ultimately led to their doom or downfall. Napoleon Bonaparte was a great unifier of France at a time when the once-great nation was reeling from the excesses of the French Revolution. The Reign of Terror, as the horrifying period in the aftermath of the French Revolution came to be called, was all the rage with various ambitious and cruel leader figures alternately conniving their way to power, persecuting and executing other equally striving contenders, and just as suddenly fell from grace and were sent to the imposingly sharp edge of the guillotine. Napoleon made political alliances with generals and revolutionaries alike, alternately setting them at odds with one another to suit his purpose, as he adroitly rode to the pinnacle of French political power and stayed there to meaningfully lead the beleaguered nation. It was so far a political strategy that worked for the erstwhile lone lieutenant from the then only recently French island of Corsica, which the French had just wrested away from the Italians.

But when Napoleon set his sights on the European neighborhood, his strategy inexplicably changed course drastically. Priority for building diplomatic alliances substantially gave way to Napoleon's seemingly insatiable appetite for conquering new lands not only in Europe but the Middle East and North Africa as well. It was almost as if he was trying to resurrect the vast expanse of the ancient Roman Empire. Napoleon, by then, was at most paying lip service to coalition-building and unleashed his Imperial Guards on the plains of Europe, occupying one after another ancient and proud nations instead of befriending them. It was curious why he did not think that what remained of these European nations, together with the unconquered powers such as England, would not come together in a coalition to try to resist and eventually overrun him. So great must have been his confidence in French military superiority. The ending was, of course, a familiar one, with a twice-defeated Napoleon sulking in the South Atlantic, where he was exiled and eventually died.

More than a century later, in neighboring Germany, Adolf Hitler, the evil that he undoubtedly was, was also skillful in forging a domestic political coalition, even with political rivals whom he viewed with disdain, and instigating rivalries among the German political parties active at the time, that eventually enabled him to claim supreme leadership in Germany. And his ruthlessness almost displayed itself immediately, as he went on to tear up one after another agreement, gentleman's or otherwise, and overran much of Europe with his blitzkrieg. Although Hitler might be said to have also made coalitions with the other Axis powers, such as Italy and Japan, the leaders of these coalition partners were all of the same ilk as himself, bent on conquering and dividing the world among themselves. He did not bother to reach out to those of different ideological persuasions, such as America and Great Britain. Again, it was almost inevitable that the other great powers would join hands to defeat him, and he met his bitter end in his Berlin bunker.

Of course, disclaimers here should be in order. First, this is in no way trying to compare certain contemporary leaders with some historical figures of mixed reputations. It is merely an attempt to muse about what lessons could be gleaned from those historical examples that could lead to alternative outcomes in modern, domestic political contestations. Second, this is also not to insinuate that leaders who are in power would necessarily instruct the investigative and prosecutorial authorities of the countries concerned to go after their political rivals. But as the chief investigators or prosecutors were often appointed or retained by the current leaders, and such authorities might or might not have constitutionally independent status, it is almost inevitable that the popular impression would be that they acted under the instruction of those currently in power.

And situations like these are most prevalent in developing countries undergoing democratic transitions. In many such countries, corruption and the collusion between government and the business community are the order of the day. This is due to plentiful "developmental" opportunities that are rife for "plucking" in such countries and also the prevalence of money politics in a socioeconomic phase where much of the population is still lingering in poverty. In other words, ill-gotten money is the low-hanging fruit, and money is needed for politics. As such, almost all politicians in many developing countries are somehow and somewhat inevitably tainted by corruption, collusion and money politics. It would appear that scarcely anybody is immune from such practices. So when one party or faction comes to power and adopts a "holier than thou" attitude in unleashing the investigative and prosecutorial authorities to jump on some other parties, factions or even individual politicians who happen to be the political rivals of those in power, those with "interests" thus affected would of course cry foul, and may actually set aside their political or ideological differences and coalesce to bring down those in power.

This is especially precarious in so-called parliamentary democracies, where the legitimacy of the government of the day depends solely on its command of a parliamentary majority. If most or all the opposition parties and leaders are targeted at the same time for investigation or prosecution for their alleged nefarious activities, these otherwise scattered factions may join hands and try to instigate parliamentary defections away from the government, thus bringing about the latter's downfall. It would perhaps be wiser for the government of the day to use a divide and rule strategy, that is, alternately apply carrot and stick to different opposition factions, thus bringing about their disunity and division and, paradoxically, the stability of the government of the day.